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The object of this paper is to explore the possibility of defending 
women's rights within a framework oflslamic concepts and ideas. This 
is to be accomplished by introducing a number of methodological 
principles that can, and for feminists should, govern the practice of 
"religious interpretation" (ijtihad) which Muslims have used 
throughout the centuries to adapt Qur)anic and Islamic teachings to 
changing realities and circumstances. The main goal is to explore 
the meaning and possibility of "Islamic feminism". The term itself 
assumes that Islam and feminism are compatible, something which 
many people will deny immediately. But it must be acknowledged 
that Islam and feminism are not simple concepts. The terms are 
often understood and explained in dramatically different ways. Thus 
it is not a simple matter to prove that one cannot (logically) be an 
Islamist and a feminist at the same time, as this would require 
proving that on no possible or thinkable account of either term 
can 'Islam' and 'feminism' be combined. 
In the course of the present discussion we hope to offer some 
account, however sketchy and programmatic, of how feminist ideas 
can be accommodated in the space of Islamic concepts and ideas. 
But first we need to explain the motivation for the search for Islamic 
feminism. There are, in fact, two reasons for the undertaking. First, 
there is a purely theoretical consideration which is suggested by the 
existence of a rich variety of "feminisms" which present themselves 
as "progressive" or "revolutionary" inflections of previously existing 
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doctrines or systems of thought. We mean to refer to liberal feminism, 
Marxist feminism, psychoanalytic feminism, existentialist feminism, 
and many others besides. Even religion and other ancient 
"philosophies of the spirit", which stand apart from most of the modem 
"isms" to which feminism gave a progressive tum, have not managed 
to escape feminist attention. They have been studied and analysed in 
a search for concepts and themes that have relevance to women's 
liberation and empowerment.1 
This being so, it makes sense to explore the theoretical possibility 
that Islam may provide room for a specific variety of feminism to 
grow iJ:l.it, as is the case with other theories and views of the world 
which have been "re-thought" by feminism. Another reason for 
wanting to explore the meaning and possibility of Islamic feminism 
is pragmatic in nature.lt has to do with the historical-cultural realities 
which must be taken into account if feminism is to take root and 
survive in Arab and/or Islamic societies. Of course, it is easy enough 
to adopt some Western-grown intellectual paradigm, say, Marxist 
feminism or liberal feminism, and then use it to understand, and 
perhaps change, the social realities in which men and women live 
in Arab and Islamic countries. But there is little virtue to be found 
in this procedure. In practice it has meant little more than the 
adoption of odd-sounding terms with no clear equivalent in native 
languages, which only served to emphasize the foreignness of 
feminist concepts and concerns. Besides, it has meant relinquishing 
the field of religion to conservative thinkers who went on to offer, 
with little or no opposition, oppressive and ill-supported 
interpretations of religion. 
For this reason it is important for us to explore the meaning and 
possibility of a feminism that can be aligned to Islam. This does not 
1 
Consider, for example, the idea that "in medieval perspective, female weakness 
can imitate God's lowering of himself through the incarnated and suffering Christ": 
see K. E. Borresen, "Women's Studies of the Christian Tradition: New 
Perspectives", in Ursula King (ed.), Religion and Gender (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1995), 249 . 
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mean that all the concessions will have to come from the feminist 
side. Most likely, there will have be a degree of dialectical give-
and-take, whereby a middle-ground position can be reached, which 
can (with some fairness) be called "Islamic" and "feminist" at the 
same time. 
How are we to approach the task of formulating a concept of 
Islamic feminism? In the second section I shall draw a broad 
distinction between two approaches to Islam: a liberal-rationalist 
approach, and a conservative-literal approach. In the process of 
doing this I shall stop to consider the somewhat progressive views 
of some modernist thinkers such as Mul)ammad 'Abduh, Qasim 
Amm, Mul)ammad al-Ghazall and others. As we shall see, these 
writers are unable to go past certain limits in their advocacy of 
women's rights. They stop far short of views that can be reasonably 
be described as "feminist". This naturally invites one to think of 
systematic methods of interpretation which are more likely to take 
us further along the feminist path. In the third and following sections 
I argue that Islamic feminism can be realized within the framework 
of a liberal-rationalist view of Islam. This is to be accomplished by 
introducing a number of methodological principles that can and (for 
feminists) should govern the practice of "religious interpretation" 
(ijtihiid) which Muslims have used throughout the centuries to adapt 
Qur'anic and Islamic teachings to changing realities and 
circumstances. 
The principles in question, which are three in number, sound 
plausible on any reasonably enlightened view oflslam. Should they 
be accepted, they would not only contribute to the elaboration of 
an Islamic feminism, but they could also be used to argue that Islam 
is not a lost cause as far as feminism is concerned, that there is 
something to be gained from standing on religious ground in order 
to contest traditionalist and patriarchal interpretations of the faith. 
Islamic models 
Great religious traditions are invariably complex and rich, which 
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makes it possible for one to view them along many dimensions. 
Islam is no exception. One can view it along a historical dimension, 
and thus distinguish between an early Islam and later historical 
stages, however these are defined. Or one can view Islam along the 
dimension ofliving practice, and thus distinguish between different 
ways in which Islam is experienced and practised by different 
denominations (Sunni vs. Shi'i ), in different social-economic 
settings (rural vs. urban Islam), or by ethnically diverse communities 
(Indian vs. North African Islam). 
There is, however, one additional dimension along which Islam 
can be considered, which is of special interest to us in this paper. 
There may be more than one way of referring to this dimension and 
the distinctions that are to be made under it. For want of a more 
suitable term I shall use "the intellectual dimension" to refer to the 
intellectual attitude with which one can approach Islam. Thus one 
may choose to emphasize the character of Islam as a revealed 
religion, or one may choose to emphasize the rational character of 
Islam. (The interplay between reason and revelation is a constant 
theme in all religions, and Islam is no exception in this regard.) 
One may view Islam in liberal fashion, or in a conservative manner. 
One may view Islamic texts literally, or one may choose to exercise 
a certain freedom of interpretation. Finally, one may view Islam as 
a way of life which is open to development and change, or one may 
view it as an unchanging tradition. 
The intellectual attitude with which Islam can be approached is 
not a tidy concept, nor are the distinctions that are made with its 
help crystal clear. But despite this relative lack of tidiness and clarity, 
it must be acknowledged that we are dealing with alternatives and 
possible methods for considering Islam that have considerable 
antiquity. In fact, they go as far back as the eighth century, which 
witnessed the beginnings of the Mu'tazili school of theology. The 
Mu'tazilis advocated a "rationalist" interpretation of Islam, which 
led them to believe in divine justice and freedom of the will, and to 
offer non-literal interpretations of anthropomorphic verses in the 
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Qur)an. Mter the decline of the Mu'tazili movement, rationalist 
interpretations of Islam were rarely visible or influential, with the 
exception of Ibn Rushd (Averroes; d. 595/1198). However, 
beginning with the period of the Arab renaissance (nahqla) in the 
latter part of the nineteenth century, and due (in part) to influences 
emanating from the West, Arab and Muslim thinkers began to feel 
their way back to enlightened, rationalist interpretations of the faith, 
interpretations which could pave the way for Muslims to find their 
place among the "advanced" nations of the modem world. 
Not surprisingly, it is among the modernizing Muslim thinkers 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that we find the 
first signs of recognition of women's rights, and the first calls for 
the removal of the injustices under which they have laboured for 
ages. Prominent examples of such thinkers are Mul).ammad 'Abduh, 
Qasim Amin and al-Tahir al-Haddad. 
According to Barbara Stowasser, the modernists relied on a 
distinction between two aspects of Islamic life: religious and 
devotional observances ('ibiidiit) and social transactions 
(mu'iimaliitP Confession of the Islamic creed, prayer and 
pilgrimage are examples of'ibiidiit. They may be viewed as religious 
duties which must be fulfilled without rational inquiry as to the 
meanings, purposes or rationale of the divine will. On the other 
hand, marriage, inheritance, the conduct of politics, economic 
activity and the waging of war are examples of mu'iimaliit. In these 
areas and others like them, believers are permitted to exercise reason 
and practical wisdom to the extent that this does not violate explicit 
divine commands, or the spirit of the message embodied in 
revelation. 
Stowasser also draws attention to yet another concept which 
played an important role in advancing the discussion of women's 
2 
Barbara Stowasser, "Women's Issues in Modem Islamic Thought" in Arab 
Women: Old Boundaries, New Frontiers, ed. J. Tucker (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1993), 8. 
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rights: the concept of "the public interest", or "common weal" (al-
ma#af:za)-3 In practical terms, this means that believers have a duty 
to conduct their lives in ways that serve the social well-being of the 
community, and to refrain from actions that are detrimental to this. 
Given due weight, the consideration of public interest is sufficient 
to give legitimacy to legislation that may diverge from the exact 
letter of divine revelation, provided that one can show that the 
proposed changes serve the common good of the community. 
It is in this light that we can consider the legal opinion (jatwa) 
that 'Abduh offered in connection with polygamy. He called for 
the abolition of (or a great restriction on) this practice, and one of 
his arguments was unabashedly utilitarian. According to 'Abduh, 
it has become apparent that one of the causes of injustice and 
enmity between children is the fact that they come from 
different mothers. For this reason it is permissible for the ruler 
(al-lplkim) or those in charge of applying the Sharf< a to outlaw 
polygamy, as well as the keeping of slave-girls in order to 
protect family life.4 
Islamic modernist voices of a moderate, reformist type continue to 
be heard, even now, at a time when conservative and fundamentalist 
voices seem to be at their strongest. One can mention Yusuf al-
Qara<;lawi, who remarked that thinking, genius and leadership are 
not a monopoly of men. He castigated men because they are always 
trying to control women's actions, never giving them a chance to 
express thems~lves and reveal talents which would enable them to 
assume positions of leadership, independent of men's controP 
Another author is the Egyptian scholar Mul;tammad al-Ghazali 
3 
Ibid., 10, 13. 
4 . 
Muammad <Abduh, al-A<mal at-Kamila li >[-Imam Muf:zammad <Abduh [The 
Complete Works of Imam Mul,lammad <Abduh], ed. Mul,lammad <Imara (Beirut: al-
Mu'assasa al-<Arabiyya, 1972), vol. V, 90-5. 
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(d. 2000), a Muslim writer who travelled in the West, and who was 
also aware of the need to present Islam in a civilized and 
contemporary form. He objected to the "hiding of faces and hands 
behind veils and gloves, making women who walk down the street 
look like ghosts", something which Islam, according to him, had 
never mandated.6 He did not hesitate to quote Amin with whose 
thinking he agreed in saying that Islam was the first religion to 
"liberate" women. Like other reformists before him, Ghazali 
believed that it is religiously permissible for women to work outside 
the home, and he showed no desire to see women live their lives 
behind closed doors. 
Still, it must be admitted that many of the modernizing 
interpreters of Islam, the very people whose writings have served 
to put women's issues on the agenda as far as Muslim societies are 
concerned, tend to run out of steam within a short distance. For 
example, Mul;1ammad 'Abduh, who thought it right to disallow 
polygamy (or greatly restrict it), found it almost "self-evident" that 
men will often need to "chastise" women: 
That it is sometimes legitimate [for husbands] to beat 
[physically discipline] women [their wives] is not so contrary 
to reason or common sense as to need argument. It is something 
to which resort must be had at times of moral decadence, and 
in corrupt environments.7 
Nor was Mul;lammad al-Ghazali, writing much later, able to bring 
himself to take a definite stand against "wife-chastisement". All he 
could do was to call for making the chastisement more symbolic 
than physical. According to Ghazali: The consensus of the jurists is 
5 
Yiisuf al-Qara<;lawl, Awlawiyat al-lfaraka al-Islamiyya fi >1-Marf:zala al-
Qadima [The Priorities of the Islamic Movement in the Next Stage] (Beirut: Dar 
al-Risala, 1991), 70. 
6 
Mul,lammad al-Ghazal!, Qarjaya al-Mar>a [Women's Issues] (Cairo: Dar al-
Shuriiq, 1990), 7. 
7 
<Abduh, al-A<miil, 208, 212. 
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that chastisement may be accomplished by the man striking the 
woman with siwiik. The act of beating must not be severe, nor is it 
permissible for it to reach the area of the face.8 
The matter of violence against women is just one example that 
shows how difficult it must be to break free from traditional ideas 
which are often legitimized by reference to Qur)anic verses and 
Prophetic custom. Other examples can be easily given. The context 
in which Qarac;lawi speaks of women assuming positions of 
leadership refers to areas of work that are restricted to women. 
Notwithstanding his example of the Qur)anic Queen of Sheba as an 
example 'Of "women-leaders", he was not a supporter of political 
equality between men and women. The same applies to occupations: 
if women are to work outside the home at all, they are to work in 
occupations that are suitable for their "feminine nature": health care, 
education, medicine, and the like. 
fu view of the many restrictions that some of modernists consider 
reasonable to impose on women, it may be difficult to accept Barbara 
Stowasser's claim that 
with some ingenuity, the modernists could very well construct 
an Islamic paradigm on the basis of the Qur>an which provides 
for full equality, including equal personal status rights, if they 
were to take their method of ijtihiid and their emphasis on the 
public interest to their logical conclusions.9 
Of course, Stowasser is referring to principles and concepts which 
the modernists sometimes employed, not to their actual practice, 
which often fell short of the ideal. But in order for such Muslim 
writers to take their method of ijtihiid and their emphasis on public 
interest to their logical conclusions a more self-conscious and clearly 
articulated conception of Islam is needed, a conception which these 
8 
Ghazall, Qagiiya, 175. The siwak is a small piece of branch, small enough to 
be used as a tooth-pick, which is (in fact) what pious Muslims use it for, following 
Prophetic custom. 
9 
Stowasser, "Women's Issues," 13. 
On the Idea of Islamic Feminism 41 
writers do not seriously attempt to formulate. 
What is needed, I think, is a radical move towards reform, a 
move of the kind that the Sudanese author Abdullahi an-Nacim calls 
for. Following in the footsteps of his teacher, an-Nacim says: 
The basic premise of Ustadh Mahmoud is that a close 
examination of the content of the Qur>an and Sunna reveals 
two levels or stages of the message of Islam, one of the earlier 
Mecca period, and the other of the subsequent Medina stage. 
Furthermore, he maintained the earlier message of Mecca is 
the eternal and fundamental message of Islam, emphasizing 
the inherent dignity of all human beings, regardless of gender, 
religious belief, race and so forth. That message was 
characterized by equality between men and women and 
complete freedom of choice in matters of religion and faith. 10 
The extant public law of sharZCa, according to an-Nacim and his 
teacher, is based on the Medina stage of Islam. That stage came 
into being "when that superior level of the [Meccan] message was 
violently and irrationally rejected and it was practically 
demonstrated that society at large was not ready for its 
implementation". 11 
Ijtihiid which takes place within the confines of historical sharZCa 
has inherent limitations, according to an-Nacim. It "cannot be 
exercised in matters that are governed by clear and definite texts of 
the Qur)an and Sunna"Y Such, one may assume, is the kind of 
ijtihiid that cAbduh and Ghazali have attempted to exercise. 
10 
Abdullahi an-Na'lm, Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human 
Rights, and International Law (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1990), 52. 
By the Medina stage an-Na'lm means the stage which was ushered by the Prophet's 
migration to Medina in 622 AD ( the year that marks the beginning of the Islamic 
calendar). In Medina the Muslims ceased to be a purely religious community; 
they became a political community as well. Unlike verses of the Qur>an which 
were revealed during the Meccan period, Medinese verses tend to be rich in 
legislation with regard to marriage, women, inheritance, and other things as well. 
11 
Ibid . 
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Regardless of the validity of the descriptions and explanations 
that an-Nacim offers of the history of Islamic jurisprudence, the 
fact remains that he does propose a rationalist, liberal, forward- 
looking view of Islam which is unlikely to present difficulties when 
it comes to accommodating women's rights (or human rights, 
hroadly speaking). For the essence of the "Meccan message" which 
an-Nacim suggests as the ethico-philosophical basis for a new 
sharıca is something which is universal, egalitarian and charitable. 
One can cite the following Meccan verses in support of what 
an-Nacım claims: 
~ 
Say: Come, I will recite what your Lord has forbidden you: that 
you associate not anything with Him, and to be good to your 
parents, and not to slay your children because of poverty; We will 
provide you and them; and that you approach not any indecency 
ootward or inward, and that you slay not the soııl God has 
forbidden, except by ıight. That then He has charged you; haply 
you will understand. And that you approach not the property of the 
orphan, save in the fairer manner, until he is of age. And fıll up the 
measure and the belance with justice. We charge not any soul save 
to its capacity. And when you speak, be just, even if it should be 
to near kinsman. And fulfil God's covenant. That He has charged 
you; haply will remember.12 
~ 
Still, the choice to uphold a rational, liberal, and forward-looking 
interpretation of Islam does not by itself show us how to articulate 
an acceptable understanding of gender equality within the Meccan 
message. Somewhat more helpful is an-Nacim's recommendation 
for us to argue for equality of men and women through a 
"combination of contextual analysis of the Medinese texts and 
invocation of the more fundamental Meccan texts".13 
Stated in these  terms, this strategy  reminds one  of  what 
12Qur'ân 6:150-1. Here and elsewhere I have followed the translation of Arthur 
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modernizing interpreters have all along tried to do: look for 
contextualizing (sociological) reasons which may enable us to 
suspend, or restrict, what an-Nacim might call "Medinese 
licences"14, while at the same time invoking the humanitarian and 
egalitarian messages of the Meccan period. Such writers have 
always done this without dwelling at great length on the 
Meccan-Medinese distinction, and without using the explicitly 
abolitionist language that an-Nacim uses. Still, it is not enough to 
speak broadly of contextualizing Medinese texts and invoking more 
fundamental Meccan texts. We need to specify more clearly 
methods and principles through which these major methodological 
injunctions can be implemented. Ttıis is what I would like to offer 
in the remaining sections of this paper. 
A role for history 
To begin to see how feminist ideas can be conceived within an 
Islamic conceptual framework, we must first come to terms with 
the fact that religious traditions do not completely stand above 
history, even when their message is of divine origin. 
The role history plays in the evolution of our understanding of 
religion is very complex. This role is recognized in the modem- 
sounding proposal to contextualize religious texts that an-Nacım 
advocates. Contextualizing in part means to understand revealed 
texts in the light of their historical context. It is also recognized in 
the old, well-established practice of examining the "oecasions of 
revelation" (asbâb al-nuzul) in search of meanings, purposes and 
guidance with respect to the application of the divine revelation. 
For the occasions are precisely this, namely, historical moments, 
with specific historical conditions of their own, iıı which religious 
texts were revealed. 
We shall dwell more on the matter of contextuality and the 
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learn to accept yet another aspect of the role history plays in 
conditioning the way we understand faith, and how we live it. What 
I mean is that purely historical developments sometimes force on 
us new understandings and practices that are in effect acts of 
interpretation, even if they are of a somewhat different quality from 
the interpretations that are made voluntarily and in full 
consciousness. Two examples can be used to illustrate this point. 
First, there are a number of Qur)anic verses which make the 
freeing of slaves one way of doing penance for certain sins or 
offences. One such verse is to be found in Sura 5: 
God will not take you to task for a slip in your oaths; but He 
will take you to task for such bonds as you have made by 
oath, whereof the expiation is to feed ten poor persons with 
the average of the food you serve to your families, or to clothe 
them, or set free a slave; or if any finds not the means, let him 
fast for three days. That is the expiation of your oaths when 
you have sworn. 15 
It is generally understood, even if apologists do not bother to dwell 
on this point at length, that Islam (like the other two great faiths, 
Judaism and Christianity) did not outlaw slavery, that verses such 
as the above presuppose the existence of slavery, and thereby 
indicate toleration of it. This does not mean, of course, that Islam 
favoured slavery in its moral code. Nevertheless, to own slaves, to 
buy them and sell them, is not something the Qur)an forbids. But 
what are we to do with this verse in this day and age, when our 
moral sensibilities have developed to the extent that the practice of 
slavery is judged to be morally wrong, and has, in fact, been made 
illegal? 
As the verse indicates, there were several ways of doing penance 
for breaking an oath. Until fairly recently, a believer could fulfil the 
divine command in one of four ways, which included the freeing of 
a slave. But now a believer cannot do that: one of the four ways has 
15 
Qur'an 5:89 . 
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been legally banned. This is a historical development that people 
have come to accept as binding on them, and on the way they live 
their religion. Of course, it could be said that God, in His infinite 
wisdom, did not prescribe one, and only one, method of expiation. 
But this is not in question. We are not claiming that historical 
developments have rendered false one of the verses in the Qur)an. 
What is claimed is simply that historical developments have imposed 
certain restrictions, or qualifications, on the way God's will can be 
fulfilled. This argues for the historicity of the ways in which we 
understand and apply divine commands: at one time we could live 
our religion in a certain way, at a later stage this is no longer the case. 
This is a fact of history which shows how naive it is to think that 
religion is a simple, unchanging essence that is fixed for all times. 
A second example which illustrates the same point has to do with 
yet another now-prohibited practice which Islam allows - sexual 
relations between master and slave-girls - "that your right hand 
possesses", as referred to in the Qur)an. According to the Qur)an: 
If you fear that you will not act justly towards the orphans, 
marry such women as seem good to you, two, three, four; 
but if you fear you will not be equitable, then only one or 
what your right hand holds, so it is likelier you will not be 
partial. 16 
Once again we find ourselves dealing with a practice that has 
been superseded by historical developments. It is not possible for 
a Muslim male to own slave-girls, much less have sex with them, 
in case he is not able to take a wife. 
When one considers examples of permissions that have been 
superseded by historical developments that could not have been 
anticipated in early Islam, one finds it easy to imagine that a fate of 
this kind could have befallen the practice of polygamy itself. For as 
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could have served (and can still serve) to undermine the pro-
polygamy position. Had this happened, would we have said that a 
non-polygamous Muslim society was in violation of God's will? 
Hardly, unless we are prepared to say that the outlawing of slavery 
is in opposition to the divine plan for human life. But this is not 
plausible on any reasonable understanding of Qur'anic ethics. 
My suggestion is that the way we live our faith, that is to say, 
which parts of the revelation we apply, and which parts we suspend, 
which parts we emphasize, and which parts we do not emphasize -
all of these things amount to an interpretation of religion. This is not 
gainsaid.by the fact that the historical processes that led to our living 
the faith in this or that way were mainly (or to some extent) not under 
our control. For interpretation is not only (or always) a matter of 
giving new meanings to texts: it can also be a matter of suspending, 
highlighting, or ignoring the placing of emphasis on this text or that. 
But this role for history raises problems that have to be addressed. 
Foremost among these is the problem of reconciling the often clear 
and unequivocal implications of the divine words to the new 
historical realities which seem to have no room for these 
implications. Slavery is tolerated by the Qur'an but is banned by 
law, as well as present-day moral sensibilities. Is this not a 
contradiction of sorts between holy scripture and the real world? 
On the face of it, there are two, and only two, ways to restore 
order to our system of beliefs. Either we say that divine revelations 
are simply wrong in our context, or we boldly assert that the 
historical realities in question are inconsistent with the divine will, 
and therefore ought to be reversed. There is no dearth of supporters 
for the second alternative among present-day fundamentalists who, 
in many ways, live more in the past than the present. Some of them 
take religious revival to be a process whereby the present is brought 
into conformity with the past. It is not improbable that some of 
them may be willing to accept all the social practices of the Islamic 
past, their logic being that the later Muslims cannot possibly be 
superior to the early Muslims. 
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What about the idea of "finding fault" in the divine revelation? 
This is not possible for believers who take religion seriously. 
Secularists, atheists and deists may take this path, believing that 
religion is something of the past, something for which modem moral 
sensibilities and scientific know ledge have no room. Devout 
Muslims, and believers in general, cannot say that. Are we therefore 
condemned to choose between either abrogating sacred religious 
texts or compromising moral convictions that historical (one could 
say evolutionary) developments has led us to? I do not think so. 
There is a way out of the difficulty which makes use of the 
injunction to "contextualize" and rely on the "occasions of 
revelation", which is one aspect of recognizing a role for history in 
the understanding of religious texts. According to Fazlur Rahman, 
Qur'anic legal pronouncements are usually accompanied with a ratio 
legis which provides a reason for enunciating the law in question. 
The ratio legis, in tum, cannot be understood without reference to 
the sociological background of the revelation, which is what 
Qur'anic commentators call "the occasion of revelation". Moreover 
he says: 
The ratio legis is the essence of the matter, the actual 
legislation being its embodiment so long as it faithfully and 
correctly realizes the ratio; if it does not, the law has to be 
changed. 17 
Acceptance of Fazlur Rahman's view of the role of the ratio legis 
in the application of Qur'anic legal enactments provides us with a 
way of escaping the dilemma. We neither have to "abrogate" 
revealed enactments, nor do we need to continue to apply them. 
The logical procedure for effecting this escape has two steps. 
First, we argue that the best way to understand Qur'anic legal 
enactments is to view them as being implicitly preceded by 
17 
Fazlur Rahman, Major Themes of the Qur>an (Chicago: Bibliotheca Islamica, 
1980), 48 . 
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conditional clauses which refer to the then-existing sociological 
conditions surrounding the occasion of revelation. According to 
one author: 
If we consider Sharfa commands and judgments as relative 
to historical circumstances, then we could assume that God 
revealed these commands and judgments with view to the 
social, historical and cultural conditions of the Arabs at the 
time of revelation. In this way the divine commands are to be 
transformed into conditional statements such as: 'If the 
conditions are of such and such a nature, then let the male 
inherit twice as much as the female." 8 
Second (following Fazlur Rahman's suggestion), we argue that the 
validity of divine legal enactments is contingent on the continued 
existence of the aforementioned conditions. Should these undergo 
major changes, or cease to obtain, then the divine commands and 
prohibitions in question cease to be applicable. To illustrate this 
consider the Qur)anic verses which legislate with respect to women's 
attire in public places. One such verse says: "0 Prophet, say to thy 
wives and daughters and the believing women, that they draw their 
veils close to them; so that likelier they will be known, and not 
hurt." 19 
According to Fatima Memissi, this verse must be understood 
in the light of the conditions that obtained at the time of revelation. 
In the early days of Islam, women of unknown or doubtful status 
and position could be harassed, propositioned or otherwise molested 
in public placys.20 In these circumstances veiling must have 
functioned as a "protective measure" against possible harassment. 
(Similar claims are still heard for the virtues of "Islamic dress" which 
18 
<Adil Dahir, al->Usus al-Falsafiyya li >i-<Almaniyya [The Philosophical 
Foundations of Secularism] (Beirut: Dar al-Saq'i, 1993), 341. 
19 
Qur'an 33:59. 
2° Fa~ima Memissl, al-lfarfm al-Siyasl [Political Women] (Damascus: Dar al-
Hasad, 1993), 229. 
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allows women greater mobility in public spaces.) Now, the proposal 
to interpret this verse as containing implicit reference to social and 
historical circumstances obtaining at the time of revelation means 
that the verse should be taken to mean the following: 
'If (or as long as) social conditions are such that believing 
women stand to be hurt when they go out in public (on 
account of their being mistaken for women of "doubtful 
status"), then they are to wear covering garments in such a 
way that they will be easy to distinguish from other women.' 
According to this suggestion, the divine enactment contained in 
the consequence-part of the above conditional statement is to be 
followed only as long as the condition which the 'if-clause' 
formulates is valid. Should the condition cease to obtain, women 
will no longer be obliged to wear covering garments of the type 
that conservatives nowadays clamour for. 
Memissi's explanation of the social-historical context for the 
veiling verses may not be entirely convincing. It presupposes that 
there was a great likelihood for the Prophet's wives, and for other 
believing women, to be confused with women of doubtful status, 
but it does not explain why this likelihood existed. Nor does it deal 
with the seeming injustice of legislating for the protection of 
believing women, as opposed to women in generaU1 Perhaps we 
need to look deeper for a richer, or more complex explanation of 
the social circumstance of the veiling verses. 
Be that as it may, there are other cases where the method of 
contextual explanation can be applied with greater success. Thus 
one may seek an explanation of the licence for men to take more 
than one wife in terms of an attempt to regulate chaotic marital and 
sexual practices, or as a solution to a problem of relative numbers 
(of men and women) in society, or any number of other ways. Perhaps 
21 
I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer of this journal for these useful 
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the same can be said for Fazlur Rahman's "contextualization" of 
Qur)an 2:282, the well-known verse that makes the testimony of 
one man equal to that of two women. According to Fazlur Rahman, 
the reason for having two female witnesses instead of one male 
specially in connection with financial transactions, is that women 
would be more "forgetful" than men, since women in those days 
were normally not used to dealing with credit.22 
To summarize: the recognition of a "role for history" allows us 
to come to terms with the fact that the way we live our faith (our 
living interpretation of the faith) is an evolutionary outcome of 
social-historical processes which do not wait upon our individual 
acceptance. Instead of denying them, we should seek to understand 
how they came about. Furthermore, the recognition of a role for 
history enables us to take (at least partial) control of the processes 
that lead to new understandings of faith. As we proceed to 
contextualize religious texts, we are freed somewhat from the rigid 
constraints of traditions, and we are left free to explore new and 
more workable models of religiosity. 
Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that the injunction 
to pay attention to history does not by itself yield to feminism 
(Islamic or other), nor does it necessarily entail a social-political-
moral order that can lay claim to universality and rationality. History 
has many uses, and the uses to which it can be put clearly depend 
on one's philosophy in general, and on one's philosophy of religion 
in particular. In the next two sections we shall see how a 'historical 
view' of religi9n needs to be supplemented with other intellectual 
principles in order for the move towards Islamic feminism to be 
possible. 
ljtihiid as rational faith 
Most students of religion will agree that religion as such embodies 
an irreducible element of unquestioning faith, something which is 
22 
Fazlur Rahman, Major Themes, 48-9. 
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not based on empirical evidence or rational argument. If religion in 
all its aspects were based on rational evidence then we would have 
a hard time distinguishing a system of religious beliefs from a system 
of scientific (mathematical or philosophical) beliefs which have 
little or no room for faith. But to admit the presence of the non-
rational (notice that we do not say the 'irrational') or that which is 
not in evidence (notice that we do not say 'that which has been 
disproved') does not by itself tell us much about the role that 
rationality, science and evidence may be allowed to play in religious 
life. 
Undoubtedly, religious practice can, and will, differ from age 
to age, and equally undoubtedly, rationality is one of the dimensions 
along which it can vary. Religious beliefs may be held and practised 
in a more or less rational manner, or they may be held and practised 
in a more or less anti-rational manner. Of course, we need to say 
what we mean by "rational". This is a term that has different 
meanings, which we do not need to discuss here.23 What we can do 
in a brief space is to give an idea of what we mean by exercising 
ijtihad within the framework of a "rational faith", which is what 
we claim is needed in order to establish a ground for Islamic 
feminism. The idea behind speaking of ijtihad as rational faith is to 
view ijtihad as a relational process which involves ( 1) human beings; 
(2) their constantly evolving social needs and circumstances; and 
(3) divine will as rational. The first two elements need little or no 
explanation, but the last is certainly problematic. So what does it 
mean to view divine will as rational? In the present context, rational 
does not merely mean an ability to understand and determine 
relations between means and ends. For such a definition would allow 
an evil serial murderer to be regarde as 'rational'. The term rational 
23 
SeeM. Stenmark, Rationality in Science, Religion, and Everyday Life (Notre 
Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1995), 20-33 for a discussion of various 
meanings of rationality. 
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as used here means additionally that which we can more or less 
understand, that which is reasonable. In our use, rationality entails 
goodness, as someone who does harm for no good reason, or for no 
reason at all, is not a reasonable person, though he or she may be 
rational in the more technical sense of being able to calculate or 
reckon with means and ends.24 
To view divine will as rational is thus to say that God is both 
reasonable and good. This is something which, I believe, we have 
to accept anyway, regardless of the use we intend to make of it in 
the context of seeking grounds for Islamic feminism. For even if 
we were to admit that God is far above our understanding, we must 
still attribute goodness to God. On no proper understanding of what 
religion is all about is it possible to withhold attributing goodness 
to God. There is another entity to which evil may be freely attributed, 
called the devil. But what does God's goodness entail, on the 
theological view presented here? Not only that God wills what is 
good for humans, but also that the ultimate justification of divine 
commands and prohibitions must (in all or most cases) make 
reference to human interests and welfare. The idea that divine will 
is good encourages one to introduce into the process of ijtihiid an 
essential distinction. This is a distinction between the essential divine 
purposes and designs and any number of historically specific rules 
and judgements which were intended to serve the essential purposes 
and designs. According to al-Tahir al-I:Iaddad, a Tunisian advocate 
of women's rights who wrote in the 1920s, one must distinguish 
between "the essence of Islam" and certain practices about which 
Islam had to compromise, given "the firmly established ways" of 
the pre-Islamic Arabs (which could not be changed all at once): 
24 
What is 'good'? This is hardly a simple question. But this is not the place to 
discuss it. Nothing in the present argument hinges on a detailed ethical theory 
about what "the good" is. For our purposes it is sufficient to have agreement 
(presupposed in this paper) on the idea that equality between men and women 
(suitably defined) is "good", that feminism, to the extent that it embodies this 
demand, is aslo "good". 
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We must take into consideration the following important 
distinction. On the one hand, there is the message of Islam, 
which is its essence, its meaning. It remains eternal, just as 
the belief in the unity of God, the perfection of morals, the 
establishment of justice and equality between people, and 
everything that follows from these essentials. On the other 
hand, we have the contingent circumstances, and the firmly 
established ways of thinking that were to be found among 
pre-Islamic Arabs. These latter were not among the things 
which Islam aimed at. Hence every rule, regulation, or 
modification that Islam laid for these contingent matters 
remains as long as these matters remain. And if they cease, 
then their [Qur,anic] judgement ceases with them. And there 
is nothing in all of this which negatively reflects on Islam. 
This applies to such matters as slavery, slave-girls, polygamy, 
and like, matters which cannot even be considered to be part 
of Islam.25 
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AI-I:Iaddad may be criticized for presenting an overly simple view 
of Islam, reducing it to belief in the unity of God, the perfection of 
morals and the establishment of justice. Still, an attempt to steer 
religious interpretation in the direction that al-I:Iaddad envisions 
need not mean ignorance of the rich complexity of Islamic ideas 
and history. Perhaps Fazlur Rahman hits the mark better with his 
more guarded statement, according to which we have to distinguish 
between legal enactments and moral injunctions when we try to 
understand Qur'anic social reforms. According to Fazlur Rahman: 
25 
Only by so distinguishing can we not only understand the true 
orientation of the Qur,an but also solve certain knotty problems 
with regard, for example, to women's reform. This is where 
the Muslim legal tradition, which essentially regarded the 
Qur,an as a law book and not the religious source of law, 
went so palpably wrong. 26 
Al-Tahir al-I:Iaddad, lmra>atuna fi >f-Sharf<a wa >f-Mujtama< [Women in 
Religion and Society] (Tunis: al-Dar al-Tunsiyya, 1992), 21. 
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Assuming that we are permitted to impart to Islam the kind of 
inflection that al-I:Jaddad and Rahman, in their different ways, 
wished to impart to it, the question arises as to the use that can 
made of it insofar as contemporary ijtihiid is concerned. Consider, 
for purposes of illustration, the practice of violence against women, 
often referred to euphemistically as wife-chastisement. Now, if we 
take seriously the idea that Islam is basically belief in the unity of 
God, the perfection of morals and the establishment of justice and 
equality between people (which includes men and women); if we 
recall that the victory of Islam over pre-Islamic customs meant, 
among other things, abolishing the custom of female infanticide, in 
addition to granting property rights to women - if we consider all of 
these things, what can we possibly say about a supposed right of 
husbands to "discipline" wives? 
There is, of course, the well-known Qur)anic verse which says: 
"And those you fear may be rebellious admonish, banish them to 
their couches, and beat them. If they obey you, look not for any 
way against them."27 But this verse must be placed in the historical 
context of a people who did not truly know what domestic violence 
means, what its effects are, or the moral injustice it represents. It 
must also be seen as part of a religion whose victory, on the whole, 
represented an overall improvement in women's conditions. Female 
infanticide was abolished, restrictions were placed on polygyny, 
certain forms of sexual exploitation were eliminated, and women 
gained property rights. Perhaps it was not possible for Islam under 
the then-existmg circumstances to ask men to recognize women as 
equals. Perhaps it would not have made sense for God to ask men 
to give up all forms of power over women at that time. Mter all, 
what religion, or society, could do these things fifteen centuries 
ago, when men did not even recognize the humanity of other men? 
But the Qur)an points clearly in t_lle direction of a higher morality 
than existed at the time. And it is not clear why we should stop at 
27 
Qur'an 4: 34. 
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the stage of early Islam, why a modem rational ijtihiid cannot take 
us further in the direction pointed to by the Qur)an itself. 
It is not to be expected that conservative thinkers will have much 
sympathy with this attempt to inject rationality into religion. Many 
of them wonder about the limits to which one may go in attempting 
to rationalize religion. 28 These thinkers are often joined by 
anthropologists who remind us that we must in the end defer to the 
ordinary believer's point of view when it comes to understanding 
what religion means;29 or that it is not accurate on our part to present 
religion in terms of "softened modernist re-interpretations" which 
are not freely expressed by ordinary believers.30 
This type of argument, however, is not convincing. It falls apart 
when we realize that there is usually more than one point of view 
for those who believe in religion. Religion has always been (and 
probably will always be) a contested field of meaning. For example, 
there have always been liberal, open-minded, progressive points of 
view, as well as conservative, literal, reactionary points of view in 
various religious traditions. All of these points of view are part of 
religion, viewed as a continuing historical process that exists in 
many places. Contrary to what some would have us believe, 
legitimacy is not a monopoly of this or that point of view, especially 
that which lays claim to either popularity or antiquity. Therefore 
there is no call for the rationalist party to abandon the field of battle 
over what Islam means, on the ground that 'this is not how it is 
28 
'
0 dil Dahir, whom we quoted earlier, formulates a concept of "the doctrinal 
essence of Islam". This doctrinal essence is summarized in these words: "Belief 
in a unitary, omnipresent eternal creator, all-knowing, and all-good, absolutely 
free, and a source of moral obligation" (Dahir, af->Usus, 2). Islam, in this abstract 
guise, is identical with deism, the religion of the Enlightenment. It is not clear 
how this doctrinal essence differs from the one that can be attributed to Christianity 
or Judaism. 
29 
R. Horton, "Tradition and Modernity Revisited", in M. Hollis and S. Lukes 
(eds.), Rationality and Relativism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982), 209. 
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usually interpreted'. What is usually the case need not always be 
the case. Rational ijtihiid is not without powerful and compelling 
arguments. On the contrary, it has all the power that rationality and 
common sense bring with them, even when the incoherent voices 
of the multitude seem to drown all else. 
Gender-conscious ijtihiid 
So far we have discussed two methodological requirements that 
are needed in order to make Islamic feminism possible, at least as 
an intellectual project, if nothing more. The two requirements are 
related t()each other in the following way. Historical-minded ijtihiid 
reconciles us to the fact of change when it comes to the way we 
understand and live our faith. Next, we look for ways to preserve 
that which seems worth preserving, and to lay to rest that which 
deserves to be laid to rest. But how is this to be carried out? This 
brings into play the second methodological requirement of practising 
ijtihiid as rational faith. This requires, at a minimum, that life must 
not be lived in opposition to reason and common sense. Still, these 
two methodological requirements are not by themselves sufficient 
to yield a position that can be characterized as feminist. They are 
indeed necessary conditions, for without them it is difficult to see 
how feminist work can be done within the bounds of religion. But 
there is nothing in them that guarantees that religious interpretation 
will represent a women's point of view. This brings us to the third 
and last methodological principle that we want to discuss. 
The basic i~ea behind gender-conscious ijtihiid is to bring out 
the relevance of gender to the interpretation of religious texts and 
the elaboration of ethical insights that they embody. Hitherto such 
tasks have been the exclusive domain of men, who often fashion 
God in a masculinist image that could be relied on to serve and 
protect their interests. The challenge that an Islamic feminism faces 
is to go over the religious texts and traditions with the intention of 
reclaiming at least part of them for women. 
One Islamic feminist writer who hints at the possibility of 
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injecting a gender-conscious perspective into Islamic studies is the 
Moroccan scholar Farfda Bananl. In her book Taqszm af_cAmal 
bayna al-Rajul wa Jf-MarJa (Division of Labour between Men and 
Women) she states that ijtihiid is a 'reading' of religious texts, and 
that no readings are innocent. She does not explicitly say that gender 
is one of the variables that need to be taken into account in the 
reading of religious texts. But the extension of her meaning in that 
direction is both easy and legitimate. According to Banani: 
If we accept the idea that jurisprudence "is simply an effort to 
understand the sharra and to interpret it," then it follows that 
that one should be able to question [jurisprudence], since it is 
a human effort, a product of the human mind. No reading of a 
religious text is an innocent reading. This is what many Muslim 
jurists admit in their writings. We find many of them saying, 
either in the introduction to their work, or in the conclusion, 
that their efforts of interpretation are their own individual 
efforts, and should not be taken as being "the" true 
interpretation of Islam.31 
Now the idea that people may have vested interests which can 
influence their understanding (an idea which must be elaborated so 
as to include gender as one of the relevant variables) is by no means 
foreign to the Qur)an. There are verses which testify that human 
beings are inclined to believe (or disbelieve) according to what 
pleases them or serves their interests. For example, the Children of 
Israel are castigated in these terms: "And we took compact with 
the Children of Israel, and We sent Messengers to them. Whensoever 
there came to them a Messenger with that their souls had not desire 
for, some they cried lies to, and some they slew."32 One can also 
cite the famous episode of the "Satanic Verses" which acknowledge 
pre-Islamic deities, and which, according to tradition, Satan put in 
31 
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Labour between Men and Women] (Marrakesh: Manshiirat Kulliyat al-'Uiiim al-




58 On the Idea of Islamic Feminism 
the mouth of the Prophet. According to the tradition, this episode 
took place during a time when the Prophet had an intense desire for 
his people to accept the new religion. Recognizing the influence 
which "fancy" has on the Prophet's mind, the Qur)an says: "We 
sent not ever any Messenger or Prophet before thee, but that Satan 
cast into his fancy, when he was fancying; but God annuls what 
Satan casts, then God confirms His signs.'m And so it was that the 
Prophet uttered verses which were sure to please his pagan 
compatriots, only because he wished so much for them to believe 
his message. Such is the power of subjective inclination! Now if 
human beings are liable to let their interests and wishes affect their 
judgement, as the Qur)an acknowledges, it is not inconceivable that 
the placing of the practice of ijtihiid entirely in the hands of men 
will lead to conclusions that systematically favour men, or fail to 
give due weight to women's interests. 
Obviously, Islamic feminists can pursue this line of thought, 
and in so doing they would still be on Islamic grounds. Consider 
the example of polygamy. As Laila Ahmad stated, the Qur)anic 
verses that bear on polygamy, taken as a whole, provide a strong 
basis for an argument which outlaws (or greatly restricts) polygamy. 
One is the verse quoted in the preceding section, which says in part 
"but if you fear you will not be equitable, then only one [wife]" ,34 
and another which categorically states: "You will not be able to be 
equitable between women, be you so eager."35 Ahmad's discussion 
raises the question of why society failed to place restrictions on 
polygamy, or ~o lay out socially determinable standards and criteria 
of fairness, in cases where polygamy is permitted. This is a matter 
of great consequence as far as Ahmad is concerned, for "the legal 
base of marriage and of polygyny would differ profoundly 
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impartially was judged to be a matter of legislation or left purely to 
individual man's conscience". 36 
Islamic feminists can ask why this did not happen, why the 
"ethical egalitarianism" found in various place in the Qur)an was 
not heeded when it came to relations between men and women. 
The question can be reasonably answered by reference to biases 
based on men's monopoly of the power engendered and sustained 
by their specialized knowledge of ijtihiid. If Islamic feminists were 
to say this, they would not be far off the mark. Of course, the 
historical fact of polygamy is not solely a matter of what religious 
texts say, nor is it solely a question of who interprets them, and 
how. It goes without saying that economic and other material 
variables are relevant to this historical fact. But one should certainly 
not underestimate the role of religion as a cultural determinant, nor 
should one think that it is a matter of indifference who has a 
monopoly over matters of interpretation. It is not implausible to 
think that if Muslim women had a voice in how religious texts are 
to be understood and applied, then an opinion might have formed 
which says that polygamy is not ultimately in conformity with the 
divine will, or (at least) that it is consistent with divine will that 
society should gradually evolve towards the elimination of this 
practice. 
The example we have taken from Ahmad's work clearly 
illustrates the irreplaceable contribution that a gender-conscious 
ijtihiid stands to make. The texts that provide scriptural justification 
for imposing social and legal restrictions on the practice of polygamy 
(and may eventually allow society to grow out of it) have always 
been there, with no one to make use of them. It is too idealistic and 
simple-minded to expect male jurists (mujtahids) to draw 
conclusions that will restrict polygamy. The marriage institution, 
36 
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with all its restrictions and licences, has for ages reflected power 
relations in favour of men. Many male mujtahids are part of the 
system of these power relations. The service they perform is often 
reflected in a failure to put into sharp relief aspects of the sharZCa 
legislation which can be used to undermine these power relations. 
Giving voice to that which has been passed over in silence by male 
mujtahids is not the only task that a gender-conscious method of 
ijtihad can carry out. It can also offer a "re-reading" of the texts; it 
can search for alternative interpretations and neglected possible 
meanings. 
Some examples will make this clear. One can mention Fartda 
Banani's discussion of the Qur'anic notion of qiwama: "[Men have 
qiwiima over women], for that God has preferred in bounty one of 
them over another, and for that they have expended of their 
property."37 Bananf derives qiwama from an Arabic root which 
means "to take care of, to serve, to protect" rather than "to lead, to 
preside over, to manage".38 
Another example can be found in the writings of Zaynab al-
Ma'adi. She suggests a distinction between that which is "holy or 
sacred" and that which is "cultural". The former includes everything 
which is "definitely" stated in the Qur'an, leaving no room for 
interpretation, or diversity of opinion. Everything else, by 
implication, falls in the realm of the 'cultural', something humans 
are free to change according to their changing circumstances. The 
author searches the Qur'an for verses that clearly say that women 
must not work putside the home, and finds nothing to justify this 
opinion. Therefore she relegates the ruling against women working 
(popular among conservative jurists) to the cultural realm, where it 
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Finally, it is interesting to look at the feminist meaning which 
Khadija Sabbar injects into the concept of infiiq, which means 
'providing for the home. Being 'a provider for the home' is the basis 
for the supposed "leadership" role that husbands have, in accordance 
with the usual interpretation of Qur'an 4:34. Sabbar does not contest 
the interpretation of qiwiima, as Banam does. But she insists that 
'providing for the home' is not simply a matter of the monthly salary 
which the husband brings home. It includes such tasks as helping 
with the housework, spending time with children, etc.40 To her such 
things are part of infiiq. This thought is not likely to cross the mind 
of a male jurist, but it is made possible when ijtihiid is approached 
from a gender-conscious perspective. These are only some of the 
interesting 'turns' that Islamic feminism stands to give to familiar 
verses and traditions which have been thought for a long time to 
favour men. There are others awaiting discovery by interpreters 
who approach the work of ijtihiid from a feminist point of view. 
Concluding remarks 
The aim of this paper has been to argue that it is not impossible for 
one to entertain feminist ideas within an Islamic conceptual 
framework. A number of conceptually necessary conditions are 
needed for this, which can be summarized by saying that one needs 
to think about Islam historically, rationally and in a gender -conscious 
manner. Suppose we were able to effect a conceptual revolution in 
the way Islam is understood, a revolution that complied with the 
requirements of historicity, rationality, and gender: would that then 
justify for us to speak of "Islamic feminism"? 
This is bound to be a controversial question. From one side of 
the divide some will say that what is referred to as "Islamic 
feminism" is not truly Islamic, because it violates major precepts 
of Islamicity, as indicated by suspension or abrogation of many 
40 • 
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licences that are granted by the Qur)an. From the other side of the 
divide, some will say that no feminism can remain within the bounds 
of religion, since any self-respecting feminism must reject religion 
and the specific understanding of spirituality that is associated with 
it.41 But this is hardly surprising. For we have known all along that 
Islam is not the same to all interpreters, and that feminism is not the 
same to all those who advocate it. There is a wide range of 
understandings in both fields of meanings, and it is somewhere 
towards the middle that I have sought to find room for Islamic 
feminisw. 
My purpose has not been to argue that this or that specific 
conception of Islam or feminism is true. This is a large task which 
I am not equipped to carry out. Rather, what I wanted to accomplish 
is to chart out a possible meeting-place for people who want to 
argue for women's rights within an Islamic framework of thought, 
as well as people who are prepared to view religion from a gender-
sensitive point of view. More work needs to be done in order to 
create a common vocabulary, and to produce intellectual innovations 
that are true to the present while not betraying the past of Muslim 
societies. 
41 
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